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The pharmaceutical and medical device industries use billions
of dollars to support the biomedical science that physicians,
regulators, and patients use to make healthcare decisions—the
decisions that drive an increasingly large portion of the American
economy. Compelling evidence suggests that this industry money
buys favorable results, biasing the outcomes of scientific research.
Current efforts to manage the problem, including disclosure
mandates and peer reviews, are ineffective. A blinding
mechanism, operating through an intermediary such as the
National Institutes of Health, could instead be developed to allow
industry support of science without allowing undue influence. If
the editors of biomedical journals fail to mandate that industry
funders utilize such a solution, the federal government has several
regulatory levers available, including conditioning federal
funding and direct regulation, both of which could be done
without violating the First Amendment.
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO BIASED SCIENCE
Scholars estimate that between thirty and forty-five percent of the growth
in medical spending is driven by the decisions of prescribers, patients, and
payors to adopt new medical technologies produced by the drug and device
industry. 1 This industry spends billions of dollars to create these innovative
products, but also spends about as much to change the behavior of
prescribers, consumers, and payors to ensure that they are purchased. 2
Against this onslaught, regulators restrict the industry’s promotional efforts
on behalf of these products, in order to protect patient welfare and to optimize
the expenditure of public and private healthcare money, so that it is not
wasted on products that are inefficient, ineffective, or even dangerous in a
given application. These regulators of promotional efforts are, however,
constrained by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
protects the industry’s right to commercial speech. 3 Here, the battle lines are
drawn.4
In some ways, however, the industry’s efforts to influence biomedical
science are more profound and more disconcerting than the industry’s explicit
promotional activities. When successful in its efforts to manipulate
biomedical science, the industry transforms the very epistemological basis
that scientists, regulators, juries, physicians, and patients rely upon to assess
the safety and adequacy of industry products. Such influence literally changes
what we think we know about these products. This section documents the
problem of industry influence in biomedical science, and explains why status
quo solutions are inadequate.
A. Industrial Science as Commercial Speech
Biomedical science is the boundary-setting precondition for industry
promotional efforts. As a veteran of the industry writes, “in the
pharmaceutical industry, there are two ways to market an approved drug for a
new use: the ‘indication’ route—performing studies necessary for regulatory
1
E. Ray Dorsey et al., Funding of US Biomedical Research, 2003-2008, 303 JAMA 137,
142 (2010) (citing Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness
Information, 25 Health Aff. w572 (2006)).
2
See Marc-Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLoS Med. 29, 32 n.4 (2008);
id. at 32 (discussing a PhRMA press release claiming that in the U.S. the industry spent $29.6
billion on R&D in 2004 and $27.7 billion for all promotional activities, which the authors note
excluded several major categories of promotional activities, suggesting a conclusion t hat
“pharmaceutical companies spend almost twice as much on promotion as they do on R&D”).
Whatever its precise size, such an enormous investment in promotional activities would be
irrational if it did not change the behavior of physicians and consumers. S ome such changes in
behavior are of course salutary, if they drive a doctor away from an obsolete treatment and
towards one that is instead effective, safe, and economical—one that just happens to be
patented by a major pharmaceutical company.
3
See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (overturning certain
regulations that pertained to prescription drug compounding as unconstitutional restrictions
on commercial speech).
4
See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a
Vermont statute violated the First Amendment by restricting prescribing information
available to manufacturers who used such information to send “detailers” to influence
physicians), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 857 (2011).
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approval—or the ‘publication’ strategy, which stimulates off-label prescribing
by using research ‘to disseminate the information as widely as possible
through the world’s medical literature.’” 5 Both of these routes crucially turn on
the industry’s ability to procure scientific studies that purport to support their
product. Thus, in a practical sense, biomedical science is the industry’s first
avenue of promotion. A longtime editor of the British Medical Journal
provocatively titled his own article on the phenomenon, “Medical Journals
Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical Companies.” 6 The
industry apparently concurs in this assessment. In a strikingly candid
document produced by Pfizer, the company asks, “What is the purpose of
publications?” The answer: the “purpose of data is to support, directly or
indirectly, the marketing of our product.” Or in short: “Purpose of
Publications: The Bottom Line.” 7
There is a growing recognition that the information presented in
biomedical journal articles is distorted by these companies that fund the
research and create financial relationships with the researchers as consultants
or equity owners. 8 The former editor-in-chief of a major biomedical journal
writes that “the public trust in research has been eroded and there is a
perception that professional fidelity and honesty on the part of investigators
and clinicians has deteriorated.” 9 More bluntly, the editor of The Lancet states,
“Journals have devolved into information laundering operations for the
pharmaceutical industry.” 10 The judicial system has begun to notice. Judge
Jack Weinstein writes, “The pervasive commercial bias found in today’s
research laboratories means studies are often lacking in essential objectivity,
with the potential for misinformation, skewed results, or cover-ups.”11
Empirical evidence supports these conclusions. The drug and device
industry is the single largest source of funding for biomedical research, both
directly in its own research centers and indirectly through grants to academic
investigators.12 In the United States, for example, industry funds about
5
Adriane Fugh-Berman & Douglas Melnick, Off-Label Promotion, On-Target Sales, 5
PLoS Med. 1432, 1433 (2008).
6
Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of
Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 PLoS Med. 364 (2005); see Dan Wikler, A Crisis in Medical
Professionalism: Time for Flexner II, in Ethics and the Business of Biomedicine 249, 251
(Denis G. Arnold ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009) (compiling this and other sources cited
below).
7
Barton Moffatt & Carl Elliott, Ghost Marketing: Pharmaceutical Companies and
Ghostwritten Journal Articles, 50 Persp. Biology & Med. 18, 19 (2007) (quoting a document
that was produced in Motus v. Pfizer, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004)).
8
See generally Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Bending Science: How
Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research (2008) (describing ways in which
scientific processes are corrupted by special interests).
9
Richard S. Irwin, The Role of Conflict of Interest in Reporting of Scientific Information,
136 Chest 253, 254 (2009) (writing as the former editor-in-chief of the journal).
10
Richard Horton, The Dawn of McScience, 51 N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 11, 2004, at 9.
11
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, UFCW
Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing on the question of
causation).
12
Dorsey et al., supra note 1, at 139; H. Moses III et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical
Research, 294 JAMA, 1333, 1333 (2005); Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454,
454 (2003); see also D. E. Zinner, Participation of Academic Scientists in Relationships with

THE MONEY BLIND

361

seventy percent of the clinical trials of its drugs and devices. 13 And even when
the industry is not funding the trial, its stockholders, consultants, officers, and
directors are often conducting the study. 14 As the federal government cuts
budgets, the industry’s role as the primary benefactor of biomedical science is
likely to grow.15
The industry’s expenditure on this publication strategy seems to be a
worthwhile investment. In a landmark review of the literature, an Institute of
Medicine report concluded that: “Several systematic reviews and other studies
provide substantial evidence that clinical trials with industry ties are more
likely to have results that favor industry.” 16 Indeed, one meta-study showed
that industry-funded research is eight times less likely to reach unfavorable
conclusions compared to independent studies. 17 Industry-sponsored studies
can be biased in favor of the product being studied due to choice of design and
methodologies, selective analysis and interpretation of data, and conclusory
statements in the resulting journal abstracts and articles that might not be
supported by the data. Indeed, there are no less than eighteen such
opportunities for motivated investigators to consciously or subconsciously
bias their research discussed below. 18
Admittedly, there may be benign explanations for some portion of the
apparent biases. Perhaps industry-funded studies are more likely to reach
favorable results simply because the industry is more conservative in deciding
which studies it funds, compared to government and foundation funders who
have the luxury of pursuing more conjectural hypotheses. 19 The industry’s
Industry, 28 Health Aff. 6, at 1814-25 (2009) (explaining further the financial conflicts of
interest present in biomedical research).
13
Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance—Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 342 New Eng. J. Med. 1539, 1539 (2000).
14
Susannah L. Rose et al., Relationships Between Authorship Contributions and Authors’
Industry Financial Ties Among Oncology Clinical Trials, 28 J. Clinical Oncology 1316, 1316
(2010).
15
See Alex Wayne, GOP Budget Cuts Likely to Hurt Research, NIH Says, Wash. Post,
Nov.
9,
2010,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/09/AR2010110906764.html.
16
Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Sciences Policy, Conflict of Interest
in Medical Research, Education, and Practice 104 (2009) [hereinafter IOM Report];
see also Su Golder & Yoon K. Loke, Is There Evidence for Biased Reporting of Published
Adverse Effects Data in Pharmaceutical Industry-Funded Studies?, 66 Brit. J. Clinical
Pharmacology 767, 767 (2008); Laurence Hirsch, Conflicts of Interest, Authorship, and
Disclosures in Industry-Related Scientific Publications: The Tort Bar and Editorial Oversight
of Medical Journals, 84 Mayo Clinic Proc. 811, 812 (2009) (discussing evidence that these
discrepancies may be due to publication bias, i.e., the industry’s self-censoring of unfavorable
results).
17
Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses of New
Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1455 (1999); see generally Joanna K. Sax, Protecting
Scientific Integrity: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 Am.
J.L. & Med. 203 (2011); see also J. E. Bekelman, Y. Li & C.P. Gross, Scope and Impact of
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454,
454-65 (2003); Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research
Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 Brit. Med. J. 1167 (2003) (showing that, over
the course of multiple studies, research funded by drug companies was more likely to have
outcomes favoring the sponsor than studies with non-drug company sponsors).
18
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
19
See Dorsey et al., supra note 1, at 141 (describing the industry’s “preference for
[research] investments of lower risk”).
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strategy could be conceived of as an efficient use of research dollars, or it may
degrade into a company’s willful ignorance of unfavorable results, as they
“decline[] to fund clinically important studies at least partly because the
results might reduce sales of the drug.” 20 The benign explanations can go only
so far, because the evidence also shows that industry-funded studies are also
biased towards being rather weak methodologically. A recent review of the
methodological quality of 886 published studies in one field of medicine
(orthopedics) found that “the level of evidence of industry-funded studies was
lower than that for studies funded by governments, foundations, or
universities.” 21
The problem is also one of trust. Even if all this industry money did not in
reality create pernicious biases in science, it has clearly undermined the
perceived legitimacy of this important institution. 22 The flood of industry
funding creates an appearance of impropriety, one that is leading towards a
“systematic distrust and devaluation of expertise” in this context.23 A former
editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) has
lamented, “Physicians can no longer rely on the medical literature for valid
and reliable information.” 24 If physicians cannot rely on the medical literature,
what are they doing instead? The very profession of medicine is at stake.
Together then, we have evidence showing that industry funds a huge
portion of biomedical science, that industry studies tend to be favorable to
industry (a seeming bias in their conclusions), but that the studies are
relatively weak methodologically (a seeming bias in their evidentiary
strength). As a result, some physicians may careen towards complete
skepticism of industry science, but the remainder who must proceed to
practice in this flood of industry science will rely upon it. Such physicians will
be swayed to use drugs or medical devices in contexts where they might not be
effective, where they might present unnecessary risks to patients, or where
they simply are not economical compared to treatment alternatives. Thus, as
the industry succeeds in warping biomedical science to represent industry
interests rather than physiological reality, it degrades the practice of
medicine, harms patient welfare, and raids the treasuries of state and national
governments.
20

See Bodenheimer, supra note 13 (describing an interview).
Shahryar Noordin et al., Relationship Between Declared Funding Support and Level of
Evidence, 92 J. Bone & Joint Surgery Am. 1647, 1647 (2010). But see Lexchin et al., supra
note 17, at 1167 (finding that within the category of randomized controlled trials, that industry
sponsored studies were no worse methodologically).
22
For this distinction in another context, see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct.
2252, 2266 (2009), observing “[o]ne must also take into account the judicial reforms the
States have implemented to eliminate even the appearance of partiality.”
23
Christopher T. Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 178 n.11 (2010)
(quoting John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
823, 836 (1985)).
24
Marcia Angell, Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Broken System, 300 JAMA
1069, 1070-71 (2008). Angell goes on to say: “It is self-evidently absurd to look to investorowned companies for unbiased evaluations of their own products. Yet many academic
investigators and their institutions pretend otherwise, and it is convenient and profitable for
them to do so.” Id.
21
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B. The Failure of Status Quo Solutions
What can be done to reduce the potential corrupting influence of industry
money in biomedical research? Current regulatory mechanisms include
litigation, peer review, and mandatory disclosure. This section explains why
they fail to solve the problem.
1. Litigation
To date, except for ex post reactions in the most egregious cases, the law
has been largely silent with respect to the problem of biased science. 25 In
theory, if the industry’s manipulation of science rose to the level of outright
fraud, a plaintiff could recover under state tort laws, the federal qui tam act,
and federal racketeering statutes—assuming that the plaintiff had standing
and that he or she could prove causation of a specific injury. Except in the
most egregious cases, these barriers are nearly insurmountable. 26
When drug- and device-makers promote their products beyond the uses
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), such violations can
lead to Department of Justice enforcement actions and seemingly-large
settlements.27 Such lawsuits do not, however, reach the fundamental problem
of biased science, but instead focus on the downstream problems that arise
when companies go too far in promoting their products.
There are also more creative theories available for litigators. In the recent
case of Merck v. Reynolds, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case involving a
securities fraud class action against the manufacturer of rofecoxib (Vioxx), an
anti-inflammatory drug approved to treat arthritis pain. 28 The plaintiffs
alleged that the company had made various misrepresentations about the
drug in order to inflate its stock price, including a March 2000 study
supported by the company and published in the NEJM. The data showed a
four-fold increased risk of adverse cardiovascular events with Vioxx over
naproxen, but the industry-affiliated authors put the finding on its head. The
authors wrote that the adverse event rate “was significantly lower in the
naproxen group than in the rofecoxib group (0.1 to 0.4),” 29 a statement that
25
Section 801 of the Food and Drug Administration Act of 2007 does require researchers
to register interventional clinical trials and, for marketed products, to disclose the results of
such trials within twelve months after study completion, on www.clinicaltrials.gov. See Food
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Following several state laws, as of 2013, federal law
will also require the industry to disclose its financial relationships with physicians, though
there are questions about the completeness and accuracy of such disclosures. See Charles
Ornstein & Tracy Weber, Drug Companies’ Reports Aren’t Always Accurate, Star-Trib., Dec
12, 2010, available at http://www.startribune.com/business/111704609.html (discussing an
analysis of Minnesota’s required disclosures).
26
See, e.g., UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
even if plaintiff could prove misrepresentations, it would be unable to prove a causal effect on
the prices paid for drugs).
27
See Aaron Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health
Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 225, 241 tbl.1 (2011) (reviewing DOJ
enforcement actions).
28
130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010).
29
Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib
and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 New Eng. J. Med. 1520, 1526
(2000).
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implies that the difference was due to a cardioprotective effect of naproxen
rather than a toxic effect of Vioxx. In addition, the investigators had
predetermined an endpoint for the study, and it was later revealed that
additional post-endpoint cardiovascular adverse events occurred in Vioxxtreated patients in that trial, but these results were not included in the
published article. 30 After the publication of this and other similarly-biased
trials, annual sales of Vioxx reached billions of dollars, but the drug was later
removed from the market due to concerns over its cardiovascular safety. The
plaintiff stockholders argued in the securities fraud case that the biased
biomedical journal articles misrepresented the safety of the product, and thus
the financial security of the company. After a win for the plaintiffs in the
Supreme Court on a preliminary procedural issue, this case remains
pending.31
Thus, the pharmaceutical and medical device industries may face
potential liability in the extreme cases that rise to outright fraud, but only on
the rare occasion that it can be detected by plaintiffs, proven in ex post
litigation, and where causation of a specific and tangible harm can be
demonstrated. The concern here, on the other hand, is about a ubiquitous
industry influence on biomedical science, a biasing pressure that is strong
enough to change prescribing and consumer behavior, but not so blatant as to
be prosecuted as outright fraud. That sort of manipulation appears to enjoy
something near legal impunity.
2. Peer Review
The biomedical journals utilize a peer review process to police the
methodological rigor of biomedical journal articles, and thus may be a
bulwark against industry efforts to manipulate biomedical science. Biomedical
journal editors have two primary tools in their arsenal: peer review and
disclosure. 32 Peer review is in one sense an extreme form of non-governmental
regulation, not unlike censorship, saying to rejected authors, “you cannot say
that here.”33 Thus, peer review is in theory a strong bulwark against the
industry’s ability to manipulate science. 34
Still, peer review focuses merely on the methods and data reported in the
text of journal article drafts, and only indirectly addresses industry influence
in a long chain of decisions that produce those drafts. 35 And, unlike a grant
30
Gregory D. Curfman et al., Editorial, Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al.,
Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 353 New Eng. J. Med. 2813, 2813-14 (2005).
31
See Merck, 130 S. Ct. 1784.
32
There are also a variety of less prominent interventions. JAMA, for example, requires
independent statistical analysis of industry-sponsored studies. See Hirsch, supra note 16, at
813 (discussing this policy and the backlash against it).
33
See Arturo Casadevall & Ferric C. Fang, Editorial, 77 Infection & Immunity 1273
(2009) (editor-in-chief of the journal, weighing the argument that peer review is censorship).
34
See Catherine D. DeAngelis, Editorial, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 8
JAMA 996, at 996-98 (2006) (arguing that certain studies were valid because they survived
peer review, even though there were improprieties in the process of disclosing financial
relationships with industry).
35
Peer reviewers are often not provided with the authors’ financial disclosures. See
Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Editorial, Reporting Financial Conflicts of Interest and
Relationships Between Investigators and Research Sponsors, 286 JAMA 89, 90 (2001). This
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funding agency or an Institutional Review Board, the peer reviewers must
assess the methodological rigor of the submitted articles after the studies have
been designed and the research has been completed. Peer reviewers’ choices
are limited to accepting an article (with or without textual revisions) or
rejecting an article (which effectively demotes it to another journal, which will
then have the opportunity to publish the groundbreaking results,
notwithstanding the limitations).
Thus, peer reviewers’ decisions are necessarily pragmatic and
comparative—weighing the clinical significance of the findings against the
study’s apparent methodological rigor, and asking whether there is likely to be
a more significant or more rigorous article in the queue to fill the journal’s
pages instead. To the extent that industry-influenced studies dominate the
medical literature, they define the range of alternative articles and thus s et
their own benchmarks for methodological rigor.
Some have argued that peer review is “slow, expensive[,] . . . something of
a lottery, prone to bias[,] . . . easily abused,” and hopeless at spotting errors
and fraud.36 Without wading into the details of that debate, for our purposes
the results speak for themselves; the foregoing evidence showing that
industry-funded studies tend to be biased and methodologically weak are
based on publications in peer-reviewed journals. 37 Thus, while one could
speculate about how much worse the situation would be without peer review,
it remains clear that peer review is not a complete solution.
3. Mandatory Disclosure
Another potential remedy is for biomedical journal editors to require
authors to disclose industry funding and investigators’ related financial
interests. In theory, readers of biomedical journal article abstracts (i.e.,
physicians, payors, and regulators) would use disclosures of the authors’
relationships with industry to calibrate their reliance on the abstracts they
read. 38
It is worthwhile to understand how this reliance-calibration mechanism is
supposed to work in practice. Suppose that a physician is deciding whether to
prescribe a certain drug for a given disease that is not listed on the label. 39
Since the FDA has not determined whether the drug is in fact safe and
effective for the off-label indication, the physician must make her own
policy is apparently intended to preserve the anonymity of the authors, so that the reviewers
do not succumb to personal biases, pro or con. Some journals are moving towards a single blind review, in part to allow reviewers to assess conflicts of interests.
36
Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99
J. Royal Soc’y Med. 178, 179 (2006).
37
See sources cited supra Part I.B.1.
38
The Supreme Court tells a similar story in the context of mandatory disclosures for
political campaign finance. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (asserting that a
disclosure mandate “enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight
to different speakers and messages”). But see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About
Disclosure, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 255 (2010) (drawing on psychological literature to criticize this
assumption as being too simplistic).
39
Such “off-label” prescribing is quite common and is perfectly legal; physicians can
prescribe a drug for any indication as long as the drug has been approved for one indication.
See generally Kesselheim, supra note 27.
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epistemic assessment. 40 The physician knows that the chance that any random
chemical would be useful for alleviating a given disease is quite low, and the
physician has no particular physiological theory that would predict that this
drug would be effective in treating the given disease. Nonetheless, the
physician has heard anecdotes that patients with the disease have improved
after receiving the drug. So all this information could form the basis for a
Bayesian prior of non-effectiveness. She might conclude that there is a 0.1
probability of the drug being effective for the given disease. 41
Now, if the physician were then presented with a scientific research study
funded by the National Institutes of Health showing that the drug is effective
for the given disease, she might then update her prior belief and now conclude
that the probability of efficacy is greater than 0.5. Perhaps she would then
prescribe the drug. 42 On the other hand, suppose that a disclosure mandate
instead revealed that the second study was funded by the company that makes
the drug. Such a disclosure would presumably reduce the epistemic value of
that second study (if the physician assumed that such industry-sponsored
studies were generally less reliable). The physician with this disclosure might
then hew closer to his or her original assessment, and thus perhaps adopt a
revised assessment of only 0.2 probability of efficacy, still not enough to
prescribe the drug off-label. In this context, a disclosure mandate may have a
causal impact, one that protects the professional discretion of physicians from
industry-biased science. 43
That is the theory. In practice, the value of disclosures is quite limited.
First, this discounting dynamic presumes that the physician has internalized
the corollary assumption that industry-funded studies tend to be biased
towards industry products. 44 Some experimental research supports the
assumption that physicians tend to maintain some skepticism about industryfunded studies. In one study, readers of a biomedical journal article that
included disclosures of conflicting interests found such articles “significantly
less interesting, important, relevant, valid, and believable” compared to the
reactions of readers who saw the same article with no disclosed conflicts. 45
Even then, it is hard to know if physicians will discount too much or too little.
40
Even with FDA approval of an on-label prescription, physicians still must make
epistemic assessments when there are multiple competing treatment options, or where there
are significant risks of side-effects, or generally if there is a risk that the FDA’s assessment may
be unreliable.
41
See generally Joshua B. Tennenbaum et al., Theory-Based Bayesian Models of Inductive
Learning and Reasoning, 10 Trends Cognitive Sci. 309 (2006) (describing Bayesian
reasoning).
42
We are simply assuming, for the sake of argument, that a 0.5 estimate of the likelihood
of efficacy is the threshold for a doctor prescribing the drug off-label. In reality, the threshold
could be higher or lower, given the risks, costs, and benefits of the drug compared to
alternative courses of treatment.
43
See Christopher T. Robertson, Biased Advice, Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (an
experimental study showing that disclosures of conflicting interests only helped laypersons
when laypersons also had access to unconflicted advice).
44
See sources cited supra notes 16-21.
45
Samena Chaudhry et al., Does Declaration of Competing Interests Affect Readers’
Perceptions? A Randomised Trial, 325 Brit. Med. J. 1391, 1392 (2002); see also Sara Schroter
et al., Does the Type of Competing Interest Statement Affect Readers’ Perceptions of the
Credibility of Research? Randomised Trial, 328 Brit. Med. J. 742 (2004) (finding similar
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Still, a primary problem with disclosure as a remedy for industry influence
in science is that the consumers of biomedical journal articles often have little
or no alternative sources of information. 46 To put it another way, physicians
often find themselves in clinical situations in which they have very weak
priors. If a physician has no information about the efficacy of a given chemical
compound for treating a disease, then even the most highly-conflicted
research study showing efficacy may push the physician over the threshold to
begin prescribing the drug. An industry-funded study is better than no study
at all. In such contexts of high epistemic uncertainty, a disclosure mandate
would seem to have no causal impact.
Indeed, in a recent experimental study, physicians reviewed a biomedical
journal abstract purporting to prove the efficacy of a new chemical compound,
and were randomized into conditions with and without disclosed industry
funding.47 Although the physicians said that they generally would find
industry-funded studies to be less persuasive, in fact they reported roughly
equal likelihoods of prescribing the new drug, regardless of whether they were
in the industry-funded or NIH-funded condition. The disclosure of industry
funding made absolutely no causal difference. 48 This study suggests that if
industry is successfully biasing science, then the physicians relying on those
studies are being biased in their prescribing decisions. Even with disclosure
and peer review, bad science is translating into bad medicine.
The foregoing study tested a clear and concise disclosure appended to a
biomedical journal abstract. The situation is even worse in practice. Many of
the most reputable biomedical journals now require authors to disclose to the
editors their related financial interests, but journals vary widely in their
practices as to what information is provided to the journals’ own reviewers
and physician readers, who rely on the journal articles to inform their clinical
decision-making.49 Many journals disclose to readers very rudimentary
information about the authors’ personal financial relationships (e.g., “Dr. X is
a consultant for Pfizer”), but do not provide any details or sense of scale,
results with multiple papers and testing both stock ownership and research grants
disclosures).
46
See Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Conflicts of Interest, 329 New Eng. J. Med.
573, 575 (1993) (arguing that “[a] deficiency of disclosure is that those who receive the
information may not know how to interpret it and may not in any case have reasonable
alternative courses of action in the circumstances”); see also Kevin A. Kerber & A. Mark
Fendrick, The Evidence Base for the Evaluation and Management of Dizziness, 16 J.
Evaluation Clinical Pract. 186, 189 (2010) (concluding that “[p]hysicians rely on the
medical literature to inform decisions, but our study suggests that the evidence base for
dizziness evaluation and management is weak”); see generally David M. Eddy, Variations in
Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3 Health Aff. 74 (1984) (arguing that the
practice of medicine is permeated by profound uncertainty about the comparative effectiveness
of treatment options).
47
Gabriel K. Silverman et al., Failure to Discount for Conflict of Interest When Evaluating
Medical Literature: A Randomised Trial of Physicians, 36 J. Med. Ethics 265, 265-70 (2010).
48
See also Adam Licurse et al., The Impact of Disclosing Financial Ties in Research and
Clinical Care: A Systematic Review, 170 Archives Internal Med. 675, 681 (2010) (providing
a literature review and concluding that “these disclosures appear to have a limited effect on
behavioral outcomes”); Bonnie E. Glaser & Lisa A. Bero, Attitudes of Academic and Clinical
Researchers Toward Financial Ties in Research: A Systematic Review, 11 Sci. & Engineering
Ethics 553 (2005) (also reviewing this literature).
49
See generally Jared A. Blum et al., Requirements and Definitions in Conflict of Interest
Policies of Medical Journals, 302 JAMA 2230 (2009).
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lumping a $500 honorarium with a $1,000,000 equity interest. Recently,
there has been a push to increase the amount of disclosures that medical
journals provide to readers. 50 Researchers have also found rampant
discrepancies and inconsistencies in disclosure policies and practices. 51 Even
worse, many readers do not even see those disclosures. Physicians commonly
choose to read only the abstracts of biomedical journal articles, syndicated
through services such as PubMed. Such abstracts usually do not include any
disclosures. When journals do provide such disclosures to readers, they
instead tend to do so in a long box located at the end of the article, which
physicians may not notice or read, and which may provide little real guidance
as to the significance or relevance of the disclosures. 52
Too often, these abstracts inaccurately report the conclusions of the
underlying articles. 53 Biomedical journal abstracts also usually include very
little discussion of the limitations of the study, and physicians may fail to
appreciate the statistical and methodological limitations, even when disclosed
in technical terms. 54 Furthermore, psychological studies suggest that
physicians likely are influenced by their initial reading of the abstract even
when they do continue to read the full article, where they might find the
discussion of limitations and disclosures of conflicting interests.55 Thus, it
seems quite unlikely that current or even foreseeable disclosure policies
suffice to solve the problem of biased science. 56
50
Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Uniform Format for Disclosure of Competing Interests in
ICMJE Journals, 361 New Eng. J. Med. 1896, 1896 (2009).
51
Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Consistency of Financial Interest Disclosures in the Biomedical
Literature: The Case of Coronary Stents, PloS ONE, May 7, 2008, available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0002128.
52
See IOM Report, supra note 16, at 77.
53
Roy M. Pitkin et al., Accuracy of Data in Abstracts of Published Research Articles, 281
JAMA 1110, 1110-11 (1999) (finding that 18-68% of abstracts (varying by journal) include
findings “that are inconsistent with or absent from the article’s body . . . even in large circulation general medical journals”). There is a debate about what information should be
included in biomedical abstracts, and how they can be made more accurate. See generally Ad
Hoc Working Group for Critical Appraisal of the Medical Literature, A Proposal for More
Informative Abstracts of Clinical Articles, 106 Annals Internal Med. 598, 598-604 (1987).
54
See Scott T. Weiss & Jonathan M. Samet, An Assessment of Physician Knowledge of
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, 55 J. Med. Educ. 692, 697 (1980) (“[P]hysicians may not be
prepared adequately to evaluate medical literature”); Bailey Kuklin, Probability Misestimates
in Medical Care, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 527, 537 (2006) (discussing physicians’ difficulties with
statistical reasoning).
55
Sally Hopewell, Better Reporting of Randomized Trials in Biomedical Journal and
Conference Abstracts, 34 J. Info. Sci. 173 (2008) (suggesting that physicians form their first
impressions of articles based on the abstracts); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1128 (1974) (describing research
on the anchoring effect).
56
For other research suggesting disclosure policies, see Mark A. Rodwin, Physicians’
Conflicts of Interest: the Limitations of Disclosure, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 1405, 1405-08
(1989); Baruch A. Brody et al., Expanding Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest: The Views of
Stakeholders, 25 IRB: Ethics & Hum. Res. 1, 1-8 (2003); Roger S. Foster, Conflicts of Interest:
Recognition, Disclosure, and Management, 196 J. Am. Coll. Surgeons 505, 505-15 (2003);
Michael S. Jellinek, IRBs and Pharmaceutical Company Funding of Research, 4 IRB: Ethics
& Hum. Res. 9 (1982); Ron Roizen, Why I Oppose Drug Company Payment of
Physician/Investigators on a Per Patient/Subject Basis, 10 IRB: Ethics & Hum. Res. 9, 9-10
(1988); Howard M. Spiro, Mammon and Medicine: The Rewards of Clinical Trials, 255 JAMA
1174, 1174 (1986); Heidi P. Forster et al., The 2000 Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki: A
Step Forward or More Confusion?, 358 Lancet 1449, 1449-53 (2001); and Kenneth J.

THE MONEY BLIND

369

It should be noted that mandatory disclosure of conflicting interests does
not even purport to prevent science from being biased. It is a downstream
remedy, one that attempts to break the chain between biased science and
biased medicine. In fact, some experimental research suggests that disclosure
mandates may actually exacerbate the biases in science. 57 Daylian Cain and
colleagues constructed an estimation task and assigned human subjects to the
roles of “estimators” and “advisors,” and then manipulated whether the
advisors had conflicting interests, and, if so, whether they would be
mandatorily disclosed to the estimators. One might hypothesize that a
disclosure mandate would cause conflicted advisors to be more self-aware and
less strident in their biases, but it instead did the opposite. The mandatory
disclosure policy apparently created a sense of moral license, or caveat
emptor, such that the advisors who were forced to disclose their conflicts gave
advice that was even more biased than those who had no such disclosure
mandate. 58 If a similar dynamic is at work in biomedical science, then
disclosures are not just useless; they are deleterious.
II. RE-CONCEIVING THE PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION
A. The Root Causes of Biased Science
Any real solution to biased science must address the source of the
problem. How does industry-funded science become biased?
First, the company chooses the investigator that it wishes to support. In
the most egregious cases, the company actually performs the research in its
own labs or through a contract organization. Then the company “ghost-writes”
the article, and thereafter recruits reputable scholars to put their names on
the publication to give it a patina of objectivity. 59 For example, in one of the
Vioxx papers discussed above, first author Jeffrey Lisse said in an interview
that “Merck designed the trial, paid for the trial, ran the trial . . . [.] Merck
came to me after the study was completed and said, ‘We want your help to
work on the paper.’ The initial paper was written at Merck, and then it was
sent to me for editing.”60
In recent years, there have been efforts to crack down on the worst abuses
of ghost-writing, but it is simply the tip of the iceberg because the industry
still provides the vast majority of funding for research, and thus can hand-pick
which researchers it wishes to support. With many aspiring scholars, each
Rothman, Conflict of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science, 269 JAMA 2782, 2782-84
(1993).
57
Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean:
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. Legal Stud. 1, 18 (2005); see also
Ming Li & Kristóf Madarász, When Mandatory Disclosure Hurts: Expert Advice and
Conflicting Interests, 139 J. Econ. Theory 47, 48–50, 60, 62–63 (2008).
58
This dynamic is similar to that documented by behavioral researchers in which
imposition of a fine for a given behavior actually caused the frequency of that behavior to
increase. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2000).
59
See generally Moffatt & Elliott, supra note 7.
60
Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped
Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLoS Med. 1429, 1429 (2007) (quoting
Alex Berenson, Evidence in Vioxx Suits Shows Intervention by Merck Officials, N.Y. Times
Apr. 24, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/24/business/24drug.html).
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trying to move up in academia or in a contract research organization, it is not
hard for a company to find a research team that will produce favorable results.
As one scholar, John Ioannidis, comments, “There is an intellectual conflict of
interest that pressures researchers to find whatever it is that is most likely to
get them funded.” 61 As another scholar has written, investigators “with a
reputation for producing favorable results for drug companies’ products are
likely to flourish, while those with more scrupulous standards are likely to go
out of business.” 62 If a researcher benefits from such a corporate largesse but
refuses to produce favorable results, he is unlikely to be so favored again. This
is the tyranny of the second grant.
And there is no shortage of opportunities for the funded scholar to do the
bidding of his corporate sponsor, even if unintentionally. The investigator
makes dozens of discretionary decisions, each one presenting an opportunity
to raise or lower the bar for the company’s product. Here are a few questions
that the investigator must answer in designing, conducting, and analyzing the
study:
Whom will I select as collaborators?
What will be our primary outcome variables (endpoints or
proxies)?
What scale will we use to measure them?
What data will we collect for potentially confounding variables?
What dosage will we use for the experimental product?
What products will we use as controls, for placebo, or standard of
care comparisons?
What dosage will we use for the controls?
Which population are we going to study?
How large will our sample be?
What will be the inclusion and exclusion criteria for our sample,
both initially and as the study proceeds?
Whom will we recruit as raters?
When will we stop the study?
What statistical methods will we employ?
How many different hypotheses will we test in our dataset, and will
these multiple tests be disclosed in the final paper?
Should we publish any of our findings at all?
Which conclusions will we report?
How will we characterize our findings verbally?
Which findings will we emphasize in the abstract, and which will
we bury in the back?
“At every step of the process, there is room to distort results, a way to
make a stronger claim, or to select what is going to be concluded.” 63 One need
61
David H. Freeman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Medical Science, Atlantic Monthly, Nov.
2010, at 80, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/11/liesdamned-lies-and-medical-science/8269/ (quoting John Ioannidis).
62
Arthur Schafer, Biomedical Conflicts Of Interest: A Defence of the Sequestration Thesis –
Learning From the Cases of Nancy Olivieri and David Healey, 30 J. Med. Ethics 8, 23
(2004).
63
Id. In a provocative article, Ioannidis offers a mathematical model that demonstrates
that because of these rampant commercial and other biases, and the many opportunities to
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not assume that all industry-funded scholars are nefarious cretins; a raft of
behavioral research in recent decades has shown that such “observer effects,”
“optimism biases,” and other heuristics can distort decisions even when a
person has every intention and every incentive to be accurate. 64
B. Money-Blinding as a Solution to the Root Causes
Science requires the exercise of professional discretion. There simply is no
way to eliminate the exercise of scientists’ professional discretion in designing
and conducting research studies, and there would seem to be no way to
monitor or modify those decisions as they are made.
And science requires money. Lots of it. Unless there is a gigantic influx of
money from the government or non-commercial interests, industry funding of
biomedical science is inevitable and, admittedly, desirable. 65 As Leo Goldman
explains, “[C]ompanies translate biologic advances into useable products for
patients. They do it for a profit motive, but they do it, and it needs to be
done.”66
This combination of professional discretion and industry money together
creates the problem of scientific bias, and harms the perceived legitimacy of
science. Still, there are institutional solutions available, ones that should seem
familiar to scholars, editors, and policymakers, because they borrow from
current practices in related contexts. For decades, journal editors have
insisted that whenever possible, biomedical research should be blinded.
Indeed, “any process using a human as a perceptor, rater, or interpreter
should be ‘as blind as possible for as long as possible.’” 67 The randomized,
controlled “double-blind” study has become the scientific “gold standard.” 68
express them, “most claimed research findings are false.” John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most
Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLoS Med. 0696, 0696 (2005); see also David L.
Sackett, Bias in Analytic Research, 32 J. Chronic Diseases 51, 51-63 (1979) (describing some
of these sources of bias); Lisa A. Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of
Published Drug Studies, 12 Int’l J. Tech. Assess. Health Care 209, 209-37 (1996) (also
describing some sources of bias).
64
See Robertson, supra note 23, at 185-88 (reviewing some of this literature); D. Michael
Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science:
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2002) (reviewing the
behavioral research literature).
65
Many commentators opine that an outright ban on industry funding and a replacement
with tax dollars is the only viable solution. See, e.g., Schafer, supra note 62, at 23 (“If the
community values public science in the public interest then it will have to be paid for by public
tax dollars.”). But see William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why Banning
“Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 Tex. L. Rev.
1413, 1448–49 (2007) (arguing for more direct regulation of privately funded biomedical
research).
66
Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 1543.
67
Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are Our Numbers Wrong?, 33 Am. Psychologist 1005,
1007 (1978); see generally D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A
Glass Nine-Tenths Full (This Is About the Other Tenth), 50 Jurimetrics J. 21 (forthcoming
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437276 (discussing similar problems and
potential solutions in the forensic science field).
68
See TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
that the double-blind study is the gold standard in medicine); Grade Working Group, Grading
Quality of Evidence and Strength of Recommendations, 328 Brit. Med. J. 1, 2 (2004)
(explaining that reviewers assessing the quality of a study “may state that failure to blind
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The requirement of randomization first effectively blinds the investigator in
the selection process, preventing her from handpicking favorable subjects for
the treatment condition versus the control condition. A double-blind study is
one in which the human subjects are unaware of whether they are receiving a
placebo or the studied intervention, and where the clinicians actually
assessing the outcomes are also unaware of which subjects are in the “control”
and the “treatment” conditions. 69 Biomedical journal editors, peer reviewers,
and readers now expect blinding to be employed wherever feasible. 70
These blinds do nothing for the eighteen opportunities to exercise biased
discretion enumerated above. What is needed, then, is a more robust blind
that covers all these other discretionary decisions. In short, companies should
be allowed to fund studies by competent investigators who provide financial
and scientific accountability, but companies should be blinded to the selection
of investigators, just as investigators are blinded to the selection of human
subjects. Companies should not be allowed to handpick the investigators who
are most likely to run favorable studies, nor implicitly condition future
funding on favorable performance by those investigators. Although companies
should be free to tie their money to specific products and hypotheses,
companies should not also be allowed to unduly influence the design or
conduct of the scientific studies that they fund. This method for reducing
industry influence could be called a “money blind.” 71
Other scholars have, in passing, suggested such a reform, but it remains to
be seen whether the concept is practicable and legally viable. 72 Such a money
patients and physicians reduced the quality of evidence for an intervention’s impact on pain
severity and that they considered this a serious limitation”).
69
See David P. Byar et al., Design Considerations for AIDS Trials, 323 New Eng. J. Med.
1343, 1345 (1990) (“Blinding is especially desirable when subjective end points, such as pain,
functional status, or quality of life, are studied, because such evaluations are open to
substantial bias.”).
70
In some contexts, it is simply not feasible to require single or double blinding. For
example, in the testing of surgical techniques or medical devices, both the surgeon and the
patient may need to know what is being done. See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology:
Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community , 44 Ariz. L.
Rev. 373, 391 (2002) (describing these limits).
71
Alternatively, following on the “double blind” model, this method could be called a
“triple blind.” Alas, the term has already been deployed for other purposes. Triple Blind,
Dorland’s Medical Dictionary for Health Consumers (2007), available at
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/triple+blind (defining “triple blind” as
“pertaining to clinical trial other experiment in which neither the subject nor the person
administering the treatment nor the person evaluating the response to treatment knows which
subjects are receiving a particular treatment or lack of treatment”).
72
Dennis Thompson has suggested that blinding could be employed in the medical
context to solve conflict of interest problems. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 575 (“Because
of the limitations of disclosure, more stringent methods of enforcement deserve consideration,
especially in cases of more severe kinds of conflict of interest. Other methods (roughly in order
of increasing stringency) include mediation (devices such as blind trusts that insulate the
physician from the secondary interest) . . . .”). Sheldon Krimsky has called for the
establishment of a new National Institute for Drug Testing (NIDT), which would receive
industry funds but then itself organize the clinical trial. Sheldon Krimsky, Science in the
Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research? 229
(2003). Arthur Schafer has suggested that, “One practical possibility might be to requir e of
any drug company which desires to bring a new drug to market that it provide to an
independent institute all the funding necessary for the design and performance of a clinical
trial of its drug. The institute would then allocate to qualified universit y and hospital

THE MONEY BLIND

373

blind would require an intermediary agency between the funder and the
investigator.73 The funder would provide to the intermediary the product for
testing and designate a testable hypothesis (i.e., that the product will be safe
and/or effective for some specified clinical indication). The intermediary
would then determine how much money would be necessary to properly test
that hypothesis, and require such payment in advance. 74 The funder will
demand assurances that the investigators will be competent and that the
funds will be managed reasonably. The intermediary would then select an
investigator, disburse the money, oversee design of the study, and provide
financial accountability. 75
Such an intermediary would have its own overhead costs that would need
to be recouped, presumably from the funders. However, the funders are
already performing the tasks of selecting investigators and overseeing their
research, so there might be little net increase in expense. To the extent that
NIH investigators enjoy more autonomy from the funder, and could develop
an economy of scale, the oversight costs actually might be less.
In principle, a for-profit, non-profit, or governmental agency could be
created to serve as the intermediary. However, the NIH would seem to be the
natural candidate for this role, since it already has developed significant
institutional legitimacy and the expertise to review approximately 65,000
grant applications per year, from which it distributes 14,600 grants totaling
$5.66 billion in awards per year. 76 The NIH could thus deploy its current
procedures and infrastructure to disburse the industry money, alongside the
researchers the task of conducting the necessary clinical trials.” Schafer, supra note 62, at 23.
See also Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Pharmaceutical Industry: How They
Deceive Us and What to Do About It 245 (2004) (calling for an independent drug
evaluation agency within the NIH).
73
Some scholars have suggested that academic medical centers could act as an
intermediary of sorts for unrestricted grants. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry
Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers,
295 JAMA 429, 432 (2006) (“To promote scientific progress, [Academic Medical Centers]
should be able to accept grants for general support of research (no specific deliverable
products) from pharmaceutical and device companies, provided that the grants are not
designated for use by specific individuals. As long as the institution stands between the
individual investigator and the company making the grant, the likelihood of undue influence is
minimized but certainly not eliminated”); see also Bodenheimer, supra note 13, at 1543 (“Some
investigators interviewed for this article felt that drug trials should be funded by industry but
that design, implementation, data analysis, and publication should be contr olled entirely by
academic medical centers and investigators.”).
74
In practice, some professional judgment will be required to assess whether the funder’s
stipulations are reasonable, or whether they are instead attempts to bias the design of the
study. For example, if a study is designed to explore safety, then severely underfunding the
study could cause the resulting study to be underpowered, which would then increase the odds
of falsely affirming the null hypothesis that there are no side effects.
75
Alternatively, an investigator may conceive of a hypothesis and experiment to test some
product and then seek funding from the intermediary. If the intermediary finds the proposal
promising, it could then request support from the company. The company could then agree to
disburse the funds to the intermediary, without knowing the identity of the researcher or the
particular research design.
76
Nat’l Inst. of Health, Research Project Grants & Other Mechanisms: Competing
Applications, Awards, Success Rates, and Total Funding Made with Direct Authority and
Superfund Funds, by NIH Institutes/Center, Grant Mechanisms, and Activity Codes, NIH Res.
Portfolio
Online
Reporting
Tools
(Dec.
17,
2010),
http://report.nih.gov/FileLink.aspx?rid=601.
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federal government money. The NIH already works in 229 different disease
areas, which suggests that it would have expertise to select and oversee
investigators in virtually any area that industry would seek to fund research. 77
The NIH also appears to be quite selective in assessing investigators and
research protocols. In 2010, the NIH approved only twenty-three percent of
the grant applications it received. 78 Under NIH policies, grant reviewers must
evaluate all aspects of a prospective research project, including “the
competency of the proposed staff in relation to the type of research
involved.”79 Federal courts reviewing aspects of these protocols have found
them “reasonable and fair.” 80 Given the NIH’s longstanding expertise, the
drug and device industry should have some confidence that their money will
be spent appropriately.
For clinical trials that will become the basis of an application to the FDA,
it may instead be more sensible for the FDA to itself serve as the intermediary,
if one is needed at all. 81 Intermediary services may be less critical in this
context, since the FDA already consults closely with the industry in design and
implementation of such studies, and thus may be able to police bias in a way
that ex post peer reviewers cannot. 82
The money blind would be applicable to double-blind randomized
controlled trials, as well as other sorts of biomedical research. 83 Single-blind
experiments, open-label experiments, retrospective cohort studies, and other
observational studies all have a role in the literature, but they provide even
more opportunities for the investigators to be biased. Even if it is not feasible
to use double-blind randomized control methods for a given question, it
would still be feasible to impose a blinding intermediary to create some
distance between the industry funder and the investigator. Although this
proposal is focused directly on industry funding of studies, this is admittedly
not the only vector of potential industry influence. Companies also create
relationships directly with investigators, including consultancies and grants to
their academic institutions, which may curry favor. Even with a money blind
in place, the companies may be able to identify the most likely recipients of
funds and co-opt them with side payments or other forms of influence. When
77

Nat’l Inst. of Health, Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition, and
Disease Categories (RCDC), NIH Res. Portfolio Online Reporting Tools,
http://report.nih.gov/rcdc/categories/ (table data as of Mar. 15, 2011).
78
See Nat’l Inst. of Health, supra note 76 (reporting 14,600 grants distributed out of
65,000 grant applications in 2010).
79
HHS Evaluation and Disposition of Applications, 42 C.F.R. § 52.5(b) (2010).
80
Grassetti v. Weinberger, 408 F. Supp. 142, 151 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
81
The FDA, however, has greater risks of regulatory capture, see infra note 92, and may
be inadequately staffed to take on these responsibilities. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, Food and Drug Administration: FDA Faces Challenges Meeting its Growing
Medical Product Responsibilities and Should Develop Complete Estimates of Its
Resource Needs 16 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09581.pdf.
82
See, e.g., Early Consultation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.82 (2010) (encouraging drug makers to
work with regulators “to review and reach agreement on the design” of studies before they are
carried out).
83
In 2009, a review of the literature that the FDA used to approve cardiovascular devices
found that although almost all the studies were industry-funded, they were extremely weak
methodologically, and only nine percent of them were double-blinded. Sanket S. Dhruva et al.,
Strength of Study Evidence Examined by the FDA in Premarket Approval of Cardiovascular
Devices, 302 JAMA 2679, 2682 tbl.1 (2009).
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these investigators then apply for and receive funding through the
intermediary, they would be just as biased as if they had received it directly
from the company.
When selecting investigators, the NIH should demand full disclosures of
such relationships, just as it already reviews conflicts of interest. Using
disclosures prospectively, to choose between potential researchers, avoids
some of the problems with putting disclosures on journal articles, after the
research is done. 84 All other things being equal, the intermediary should
award grants to researchers that have the fewest such relationships, and that
preference should create an incentive for competing investigators to avoid
such relationships.
Still, one might worry that the investigators who have the closest
relationships with industry will also have the greatest expertise in testing the
drug, creating a Gordian knot for the intermediary.
On the other hand, it may be that much of the research that is now
conducted by investigators closely affiliated with industry could instead be
conducted by others who absolutely reject such relationships. After all, science
has two different functions—the generation of novel hypotheses and the
testing of those hypotheses. 85 Perhaps the top scholars in the field must
necessarily have relationships with industry to advise and assist them in
generating novel compounds and groundbreaking hypotheses. But it is not
clear why those persons also need to be the ones testing those hypotheses,
conducting the mundane and routine tests of efficacy and safety. After all, a
well-run experiment is more about mechanical adherence to a protocol,
methodical record keeping, complete transparency, financial accountability,
and logistical management of thousands of patients at potentially a dozen
research centers. 86 Thus, when the intermediary weighs proposals by research
teams, it may perform an initial screen to eliminate investigators that appear
to be conflicted or incompetent for the task, and then simply award the grant
randomly to any one of the remaining research teams. 87
One also should not be naïve about the possibility that this intermediary
institution might become too cozy with the companies that are providing its
revenue, and thereby shade its own decisions in favor of the companies’
interests rather than patients’ interests. The NIH had an embarrassing string
of scandals in the early 2000s, which revealed that NIH officials also received
84

See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
See Dean Keith Simonton, Scientific Genius: A Psychology of Science 5, 42
(1990) (discussing Thomas Kuhn’s recognition of an “essential tension” between the
“traditionalist” and the “iconoclast” roles of a scientist and F. C. Bartlett’s differentiation
between “original and routine information processing”).
86
Indeed, the industry already outsources much of these routine testing functions to
contract research organizations, the key is simply to break the yoke of influence over them. See
Schafer, supra note 62, at 23 (under the status quo, “[c]ontract research organisations with a
reputation for producing favourable results for drug companies’ products are likely to flourish,
while those with more scrupulous standards are likely to go out of business”); see generally
Phillip Mirowski & Robert Van Horn, The Contract Research Organization and the
Commercialization of Scientific Research, 35 Soc. Stud. Sci. 503 (2005) (describing this
trend).
87
I thank Larry Lessig for this insight.
85

376 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 37 NOS. 2&3 2011
industry money through consulting and other relationships. 88 Some have
argued that the FDA has been “captured” by the companies it regulates, a
problem that has allegedly gotten worse after the creation of a user-fee driven
financing system.89 Still, the analysis must be comparative. Presumably, the
NIH could maintain more independence from the commercial interests than
the company managers that are currently administering these grants to
investigators. Moreover, the randomization function would also be useful to
prevent the intermediary from exercising biased discretion.
Admittedly, the money-blinding mechanism would not eliminate every
sort of bias that currently infects biomedical science. As long as industry
chooses the topics for the research it funds, those topics will be biased towards
investigations of patented drugs and devices for indications that have large
potential markets. Non-financial biases will also continue to exist. For
example, published research will continue to be biased towards studies that
purport to disprove null hypotheses, rather than those that affirm the null
hypothesis.90 The latter study, which simply shows that something does not
work, seems less interesting and less exciting. One could craft other policies to
address those problems while still conceding that the money-blind solves the
problem it addresses.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF MONEY-BLINDING WITHOUT VIOLATING
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
How would such a requirement of money-blinding be enforced? There are
several options for bringing such a mechanism to fruition, including private
ordering mechanisms, which do not raise First Amendment problems, and
regulatory efforts, which raise surmountable First Amendment problems. This
section considers each.
A. Private Ordering
In a well-functioning market for information, one might hope that the
industry would voluntarily adopt money-blinding as a way to maximize the
persuasiveness of its publications, at least when its products really are as safe
and effective as it claims. 91 This dynamic, however, assumes that biomedical
88
See David Willman, Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical
Research, L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/dec/07/nation/na-nih7;
David Willman, Ex-NIH Director Now Favors Limiting Drug Company Ties, L.A. Times, Mar.
13, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/13/nation/na-nih13.
89
Curt D. Furberg et al., The FDA and Drug Safety: A Proposal for Sweeping Changes, 166
Archives Internal Med. 1938, 1940 (2006) (“Another problem may relate to the source of
FDA funding. Critics of the FDA have claimed that the agency has gotten too close to the
industry it is supposed to regulate, in part because of its dependence on user fees. Indeed, each
of the past 3 iterations of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act has required that the FDA
produce or perform something of value to the pharmaceutical industry in exchange for which
the industry would agree to pay the fees. Until the last iteration, the FDA was prohibited from
using any funds from user fees to support postmarketing studies of safety.”).
90
See Gwendolyn B. Emerson & James D. Heckman, Testing for the Presence of PositiveOutcome Bias in Peer Review, 170 Archives Internal Med. 1934, 1936 (2010) (showing
positive-outcome bias in a randomized trial with peer reviewers for two journals).
91
See generally Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J.
Econ. 107, 107 (1997) (providing a skeptical analysis of a similar market for advice); Gillian
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journal editors and readers are able to, and actually do, perceive the biases in
un-blinded research and discount the credibility of such studies accordingly. 92
As the foregoing analysis shows, this assumption is false. 93
Alternatively, one could imagine that the editors and peer reviewers of
biomedical journals, such as the New England Journal of Medicine or the
Journal of the American Medical Association, would simply refuse to publish
studies that are not money-blinded, just as they currently disfavor studies that
are not double-blinded. Of course, there is a transition problem. An
intermediary institution will need to step forward, and there are currently
thousands of merely double-blinded studies that are in the pipeline. But that
problem is manageable.
More fundamentally, there are some reasons to think that the biomedical
journals may not rise to this occasion. First, there is a race-to-the-bottom
problem. No single journal will want to unilaterally exclude the large
proportion of articles that are industry-funded, if there are other journals
blithely continuing to accept merely double-blinded studies. No journal wants
to be scooped in reporting a significant advance in medical practice.
Moreover, some of the biomedical journals are themselves addicted to
industry money that comes either directly for the purpose of advertising, or to
purchase reprints of favorable articles, or indirectly through the professional
societies that run the journals and receive grants from industry. 94 Thus,
journal editors may be susceptible to industry boycotts or more subtle
commercial pressures, just as they have previously expressed gratitude, on
their editorial pages, for the largesse they currently enjoy. 95
Thus, if biomedical journals are going to succeed in implementing a
money-blinding mandate, they may need to do so collectively, perhaps
through the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE).
Currently, nearly 1,000 journals follow the ICMJE’s Uniform Requirements
for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals, which includes various
requirements relating to conflicts of interests, but says nothing about
blinding.96 One may reasonably hope that biomedical journals will rise to this
occasion, but there are also other available levers of influence.
Hadfield et al., Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy, 21 J.
Consumer Pol’y 131, 144 (1998) (“The complex nature of information also requires careful
analysis of the potential for market mechanisms to provide the information consumers might
want and need. Information is a notoriously difficult commodity over which to contract.
Potential buyers of information have difficulty determining, in their uninformed state, the
value of the information and thus the price they are willing to pay for it.”).
92
See Robertson, supra note 43 (discussing this dynamic, and showing empirical evidence
that laypersons fail to perform such discounting).
93
See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing peer review and disclosures as ineffective
solutions).
94
See Debbie Sieber et al., Extent and Nature of Advertising in Leading HematologyOncology Journals, 32 Am. J. Clinical Oncology 92, 92-93 (2009) (citing sources that the
industry spent $850 million on journal advertising in 2005).
95
See David Orentlicher & Michael K. Hehir, Advertising Policies of Medical Journals:
Conflicts of Interest for Journal Editors and Professional Societies, 27 J.L. Med. & Ethics 113,
114 (1999) (discussing the conflicts of interest inherent in the practice of accepting industry
money, and discussing journal editors’ feelings and expressions of gratitude).
96
See Journals that Have Requested Inclusion on the List of Publications that Follow the
ICMJE’s Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals , Int’l
Comm. of Med. Journal Editors, http://www.icmje.org/journals.html (last visited Apr. 4,
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Universities could exert influence in favor of money-blinding as a way to
manage the conflicts of interests of its faculty. In recent years, several schools
have made prominent efforts to revise their policies regarding whether and
how faculty may accept money from the pharmaceutical and device
industries. 97 Announcing such revisions, Dr. Philip A. Pizzo, Dean of Stanford
Medical School, said, “We welcome interactions with industry that are
positive and collaborative. But where I think the line should not be crossed
and where we are not going to allow our full-time or part-time faculty to
engage is in marketing.”98 Yet, the industry itself seems to put biomedical
science on the same side of the line as marketing, and thus university policies
arguably should as well. 99 In principle, after transitional problems are
resolved, faculties should welcome such a change towards money-blinding, if
it allows them to continue to garner industry funding without having to be
accountable to industry influence.
Still, a significant portion of biomedical science supported by industry is
actually performed by the companies themselves through subsidiaries or
clinical practice companies, without any involvement by university
researchers. 100 This is the most extreme form of un-blinded research, given
that industry scientists can be handpicked and then fired at will, creating the
greatest incentives and temptations for bias. Arguably, this practice should be
stopped, and to the extent that such research is intended to inform and
influence prescribing behavior, it should be outsourced to credible academic
researchers, working with the protection of blinds. By refusing to publish unblinded studies, biomedical journal editors have the leverage to cause a shift
in the economics of biomedical research.
If biomedical journal authors, editors, and/or universities succeed in
enforcing a norm of money-blinding, the industry could comply by simply
channeling their existing expenditures for biomedical research to the
intermediary. On the margin, however, companies may decide that it is not
worthwhile to fund some studies, and face the risk of adverse results, if they
are unable to influence the study. Thus, it is possible that on net, fewer
2011) (listing journals); Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical
Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication , Int’l Comm. of Med. Journal
Editors (Apr. 2011) http://www.icmje.org/urm_full.pdf (providing the policy).
97
See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Stanford Medical School to Expand Ethics Rules, N.Y. Times,
Mar.
21,
2010,
at
B3,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/health/policy/22docs.html
(describing
a
new
prohibition on adjunct faculty “giving paid speeches drafted by the makers of drugs or medica l
devices”); School of Medicine Policy Overview, Stanford School of Medicine,
http://med.stanford.edu/coi/overview.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). But see John
Dorschner, Investigators Question Drug-Makers Payments to University of Miami Doctors,
Miami
Herald,
Dec.
20,
2010,
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/12/20/1982509/investigators-question-drugmakers.html#ixzz18lCuiADQ (“Stanford was the lead example [of non-compliance with its
own policy], with two doctors earning more than $100,000 in the past year for making
speeches paid for by drug companies, even though Stanford forbids its faculty from taking
such fees.”).
98
Singer, supra note 97.
99
See supra text accompanying note 7 (quoting Pfizer documents).
100
Jef Akst, Contract Research on the Rise, The Scientist (Aug. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.the-scientist.com/blog/display/55878/ (describing the history of this i ndustry and
its recent changes); see also sources cited supra note 86.
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research dollars will be spent, but the studies that are funded and published
will be less biased.
B. Narrowly Conditioning NIH Funding
Suppose that the biomedical journal authors and editors do not adopt
money-blinding within a reasonable time. What levers are available to
regulators to force such a transition? Are such governmental interventions
consistent with the First Amendment?
One option would be to attach conditions to the billions of dollars that the
NIH spends in support of biomedical research. The NIH could also require
that the individual investigators who receive funding for specific projects
publish the primary results only in journals that have a satisfactory moneyblinding policy.101 In effect, this policy would force journals to choose between
publishing NIH-funded research or publishing un-blinded research.
The federal government already attaches all sorts of conditions to its
research money, such as the requirement to submit protocols to Institutional
Review Board and the requirement to publish raw data. 102 Indeed, the NIH
has compiled a list of over seventy other conditions on grant funding, on a
gamut of topics from animal welfare and patient confidentiality, to the use of
seat belts and smoke detectors. 103
Would such a condition on federal funding survive constitutional
scrutiny? Arguably, it is a restriction on free speech, essentially telling
investigators who receive federal money that they cannot write about their
funded research in certain outlets, at least not until they have first published
their primary results in money-blinded journals, as required by their grant
contract. However, it is an extremely narrow restriction on speech, tailored to
the expenditure of federal moneys. Likewise, one could imagine that when the
United States Army purchases advertising from Madison Avenue agencies to
support its recruiting efforts, the Army specifies which sorts of magazines to
target and which to avoid (e.g., Guns and Ammo rather than Creative
Knitting). Such an ad vendor could hardly raise a free speech objection to
such a condition of federal funding.
Indeed, in Rust v. Sullivan, the government had chosen to subsidize
certain family planning services, while also prohibiting the funds from being
used for counseling about abortion as a form of family planning. 104 The
Supreme Court upheld the law, holding that:
101
Schematically, this mandate would be most similar to the requirement that
investigators register at ClinicalTrials.gov certain clinical trials within twenty -one days of the
first subject being enrolled, and then report summary results within one year of the
completion date. See Nat’l Inst. of Health, NIH Grants Policy Statement, NIH Office of
Extramural
Research,
§
4.1.3
exhibit
4,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2010/nihgps_ch4.htm#public_policy_requiremen
ts_other_mandates (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
102
See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects: To What Does this
Policy Apply?, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2008) (known as “the Common Rule”); Intangible Property,
45 C.F.R. § 74.36 (2008) (giving the government the right to publish data and requiring
recipient to publish data after Freedom of Information Act requests).
103
See Nat’l Inst. of Health, supra note 101, § 4.1.
104
500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991).
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the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead
simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for
which they were authorized. The Secretary’s regulations do not
force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they
merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and
distinct from Title X activities. 105
Likewise here, the strings on NIH funding would simply be a narrow
insistence about the way those public funds should be used, and thus would
easily survive constitutional scrutiny. If an investigator prefers to publish in
journals that do not require money-blinding, then she can simply seek
funding elsewhere. If, on the other hand, an investigator accepts federal
funding, the publication requirement applies only to that investigator, not to
other researchers who are free to take industry money directly and publish in
any journal they see fit. Thus, the constitutional case is straightforward.
C. Attaching Strings to Federal Funding
Suppose that the narrow conditions on funding would not suffice to
change the behavior of top journal editors and authors, and thus the behavior
of industry funders. 106 A more ambitious governmental policy would attach
strings that reach beyond the individual funded projects to impact all of the
funded investigator’s work, and all of the work of other investigators at her
institution. The government could require that any institution that receives
NIH funding (or other federal funding) refuse all industry funding to the
institution, unless the industry money is routed through an accredited
blinding intermediary. 107 Many federal grant programs are already limited to
non-profit and public entities, and thereby exclude industry from receiving
such funds directly. 108 And, the federal government already requires all grant
recipients to maintain a conflict of interest policy, and to police the conflicts
of interest that might impact the federal grant. 109 This proposed policy extends
that logic, building a taller wall between industry and the recipients of federal
grants.
Such a proposed policy would force an institutional choice between
federal government money versus un-blinded industry money. Of course, it is
105

Id. at 196.
In this situation, journals would likely become specialized, some accepting industry funded papers without the money blind and others accepting NIH-funded, foundation-funded,
and money-blinded papers (if any). This outcome may be better than the status quo, if it helps
consumers of science more appropriately weigh their reliance on the studies they read, using
the journal’s name as a proxy for scientific objectivity. Nonetheless, the following analysis
presumes that regulators want to go further to cause a more complete shift to money -blinding.
107
An alternative policy would be to require all investigators at the funded institution to
publish exclusively in money-blinded journals, regardless of the source of their funding. This
would be a more direct regulation of speech, and is set aside for now.
108
See, e.g., Health Resources and Services Admin., The Health Center Program:
Summary
of
Key
Health
Center
Program
Requirements,
http://bphc.hrsa.gov/about/requirements.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (“Health centers are
non-profit private or public entities . . .”); The Office of Minority Health, Non-Profit
Organizations, http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/templates/browse.aspx?lvl=2&lvlID=2 (last
visited Apr. 7, 2011) (“Only public or nonprofit private institutions of higher learning may
apply for training grants . . . .”).
109
See 40 C.F.R. § 50.605 (2010).
106
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possible that some institutions would choose to reject all federal funding,
rather than mandate money-blinding. Given the amount of money involved
and the comparative prestige associated with NIH funding, it seems unlikely
that major research institutions would reject federal funding with such strings
attached.
This proposed policy is more expansive than the previous one (see Part
III.B supra) because it does not merely govern how the institution will spend
the public money it receives. By instead screening which institutions receive
federal money, this policy promotes public policy goals that are related to, but
distinct from, the expenditure of public money, and thus arguably cannot take
advantage of the narrow holding in Rust. Of course, the federal government
has long used such string-tying mechanisms to achieve various and sundry
public policy purposes that are not directly relevant to the scientific research
being funded. For example, Congress has prohibited recipient institutions
from discriminating against women in college sports and also forced such
institutions to cooperate with discrimination against homosexuals in the
military.110
In 2008, the Supreme Court heard litigation over the Solomon
Amendment, which required all institutions that receive federal funding to
cooperate with military recruiters, notwithstanding their discriminatory
practices.111 The Solomon Amendment seemed particularly onerous to law
schools since the federal money was given for biomedical research on specified
projects and had no direct relationship to the career services offices at the law
schools, which nonetheless fell under its regulatory ambit. In Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the statute, holding that it
neither denies the institutions the right to speak, nor requires them to say
anything.112 By interpreting the ambit of the statute in this way, the Supreme
Court avoided a clash with the First Amendment. Likewise, the instant policy
does not directly regulate speech. Even if a university accepts federal funding,
it can continue to say or write anything it wants, and thus there is no clash
with the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has said, “Congress is free
to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial
assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept.” 113
Still, to the extent that the proposed policy restricts grant recipients from
also receiving un-blinded money from industry, it could indirectly regulate
scientific expression. 114 This analysis raises the “unconstitutional conditions”
110
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 58
(2006) (“Either allow military recruiters the same access to students afforded any other
recruiter or forgo certain federal funds.”).
111
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b) (West 2011). The Solomon Amendment was repealed in early
2011.
112
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. at 60.
113
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984). In Grove City, the Supreme Court
rejected a private college’s claim that conditioning federal funds on its c ompliance with Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 violated the First Amendment, without even
reaching the First Amendment claims, because the school was free to decline federal money.
114
In the context of political campaign finance, the Supreme Court has long scrutinized
the regulation of money contributions because, in the mass media age, money is a necessary
precondition to speech reaching its audience. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010) (holding that corporations have free speech rights); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19
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doctrine. 115 “The government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he
has no entitlement to that benefit.” 116 For example, in FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that withheld
federal funding to public radio stations that insisted upon doing editorials on
the air, a form of expression that “lies at the heart of First Amendment
protection.”117
On the other hand, because the government is here acting as contractor
and not as sovereign, perhaps the indirect restrictions on speech would not
compel strict scrutiny at all, but instead may require only a reasonableness
analysis. In Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v.
Umbehr, the Supreme Court held that “[d]eference is therefore due to the
government’s reasonable assessments of its interests as contractor.”118 The
argument would be that the NIH’s restrictions will “prevail if it can persuade
the District Court that the [the Government’s] legitimate interests as
contractor, deferentially viewed, outweigh the free speech interests at stake.” 119
If a court were to apply Umbehr to a situation involving the financing of
medical research, then the regulation should be fairly easy to defend. Given
(1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s
mass society requires the expenditure of money.”). Arguably, the proposed policy also regulates
the grant recipient’s right of free association by proscribing the terms in which the recipient
can associate with industry. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640 (2000), the
Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association was vi olated by a
state law that required the organization to accept a homosexual scoutmaster. The pattern in
Boy Scouts was thus the opposite of the present proposal, which prohibits certain associations.
Regardless of that distinction, the Boy Scouts holding is likely inapposite to the proposed
policy for the same reason that the Court distinguished the case in Rumsfeld v. FAIR: the
military recruiters were not members of the universities. Id. at 648.
115
See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413,
1421 (1989).
116
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[I]f the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Such interference
with constitutional rights is impermissible.”).
117
468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984).
118
518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996). The Court wrote that the plaintiff “is correct that if the Board
had exercised sovereign power against him as a citizen in response to his political speech, it
would be required to demonstrate that its action was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. But in this case, as in government employment cases, the Board
exercised contractual power, and its interests as a public service provider, including its interest
in being free from intensive judicial supervision of its daily management functions, are
potentially implicated. Deference is therefore due to the government’s reasonable assessments
of its interests as contractor.” Id.
119
Id. at 685 (part III). This analysis presumes that the speech at issue is a matter of
public concern. Although the First Amendment protects government employees and
contractors’ rights to speak freely “on matters of public concern[,] . . . speech on merely
private employment matters is unprotected.” Id. at 675 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
146 (1983)). It is not precisely clear where speech about the effectiveness of a dru g would fall
on this spectrum.
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the problem of biased science and its impact on the practice of medicine and
national healthcare costs, along with the failure of status quo remedies of peer
review and disclosure mandates, this simple weighing of interests would seem
to favor the proposed policy.
Aside from these complicated doctrines it is also true that, if the
government could constitutionally use its power as a sovereign to directly
regulate speech, it could thus use its power as a funder to do the same. 120
Therefore it is worthwhile to consider the constitutionality of direct
regulation, even if such a mechanism were not in fact employed.
D. Direct Regulation of Industrial Science
Regulators could directly target drug- and device-makers, prohibiting
them from using their money to unduly influence the science that tests the
safety and efficacy of their own products. The policy would say that, if a
company wishes to support scientific tests of its own products, then it needs to
use a money-blinding mechanism to allow the investigators to work
independently, so that the science is as objective as it purports to be. The
regulator’s motivation would be to prevent physicians from being influenced
by biomedical science that may appear to be robust and objective, but is
actually biased and thus misleading.
Although such a regulatory intervention may seem far-reaching, it is in
accordance with current policies that prohibit pharmaceutical companies
from promoting drugs beyond those indications that the FDA has approved. 121
The FDA has held that “the ban on off-label promotion applies not just to
pharmaceutical and medical device companies themselves, but also to
financially-interested third-parties, such as physicians who participate in
clinical trials or who are paid to promote the products on the manufacturer’s
behalf” or the providers of Continuing Medical Education (CME) programs.122
120

(2006).

See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 59

121
These policies do not arise from a single statutory source. See generally 21 U.S.C.S. §
355 (LexisNexis 2006) (prohibiting the sale of unapproved drugs, and limiting their labels and
accompanying material to “prescribing, recommending, or suggesting” uses which are
supported by an adequate scientific basis); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348 -50
(1948) (adopting an expansive definition of “accompanying material” to many forms of
industry communications about their products); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1) (expanding this
definition further to encompass virtually all efforts to promote the product); Gregory Conko,
Truth or Consequences: The Perils and Protection of Off-Label Drug and Medical Device
Promotion, 21 Health Matrix (forthcoming 2011) (Competitive Enterprise Institute,
Working
Paper
No.
2010-9,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677609 (describing and criticizing this
regulatory evolution).
122
Conko, supra note 121, at 14 (citing FDA, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported
Scientific and Educational Activities, Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997)); see also 21
C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1) (2010) (regulating industry sponsored CME programs). The FDA’s
rationale for this broad regulatory power rests on the statutory requirement that labels must
describe the product’s intended use, and that industry efforts to promote another use suggest
that the product is mislabeled in the first place. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,075 (“The ‘intended use’
of a drug or device refers to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the
labeling of the product. This intent is determined by such persons’ expressions or by the
circumstances surrounding the distribution of the article including, for example, labeling
claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their
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If the industry is using these people to promote their products off-label, then
this would seem to show an intent to sell the product for off-label uses, which
contravenes the current statute. 123
Presently, the FDA declines to regulate industry financial support for
scientific and educational activities when those activities are “independent”
from the drug- or device-maker, even if the company has funded the activity.
In short, if “an industry-supported activity is independent,” then it is “not
generally subject to regulation.” 124 Arguably, because of the many vectors for
influence discussed above, an industry-supported scientific research study
could be independent only if the study was money-blinded. 125 Just as in CME
programs, if the company “is involved in the selection of” investigators, and
the investigators “have reason to believe that future financial support from the
company depends upon producing” publications “that promote the company’s
products,” then the investigator is not independent. 126 Accordingly, scholars
have called for a central-pooling mechanism for CME funding, not unlike the
solution for biased science proposed here. 127 On the other hand, “companies
and [investigators] who wish to ensure that their activities will not be subject
to regulation should design and carry out their activities free from the
supporting company’s influence and bias.” 128 In short, adopt money-blinding.
The FDA has provided a compelling First Amendment analysis of its
regulation of industry influence in educational and scientific activities, such as
CME programs, applying the well-known Central Hudson test.129 Rather than
representatives.”) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2006); Alberty Food
Prods. Co. v. United States, 185 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1950) (drug product was misbranded
because its labeling failed to state the intended use of the drug as suggested by the company in
newspaper advertisements)).
123
But see Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the
FDA, and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection , 37
Am. J.L. & Med. 315, 343 (2011) (arguing that the FDA’s analysis is flawed because companies
always know that their products will be used off-label, and thus such off-label promotion
proves nothing). Klasmeier and Redish seem to assume that knowledge is necessarily
equivalent to intent, but the distinction is routinely made throughout the law. See Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010) (distinguishing between knowledge
and intent in another context: “Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a
violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’ s connection to terrorism,
not specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities”); United States v. Delgado,
631 F.3d 685, 695 (5th Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic that more is required than mere knowledge
of the purpose of a conspiracy.”).
124
FDA, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities;
Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997).
125
See supra Part II.A.
126
FDA, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities;
Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,083 (referring to CME providers).
127
Robert Steinbrook, Financial Support of Continuing Medical Education, 299 JAMA
1060, 1062 (discussing a solution of “eliminating direct or indirect commercial support of
programs but allowing contributions to a central repository of funds, which, in turn, would
disburse funds to approved programs”).
128
62 Fed. Reg. at 64,084.
129
The FDA relies on this explanation from the Supreme Court:
The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or
commercial speech related to illegal activity. If the communication is neither
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being an instance of political speech, which is at the core of the First
Amendment, this regulation arises in the commercial context of healthcare—
drugs and devices in particular—which are already deeply regulated in
America. As shown in Part I, it is now widely recognized by both biomedical
journal editors and by the industry itself that these efforts to fund and
manipulate science are designed to sell more drugs. 130 The government’s
interest is quite compelling. At a time when healthcare costs are consuming
more than a sixth of the entire economy, there can be little doubt that the
government has a compelling interest in seeing that biomedical science is
accurate and objective. 131
Yet, the evidence shows that, at least in the aggregate, the speech in these
industry-funded articles is biased and it misleads the physicians and
regulators who rely upon it. 132 Still, one must concede that not every industryfunded article is biased, or that every biased article misleads physicians. 133 The
blinding proposal merely acts as a filter, allowing industry to continue funding
scientific speech, but stripping it of its bias. To the extent that the science is
not actually biased, then the industry money will pass through the
intermediary and allow the same speech that the company intended. Part II
has also shown that less intrusive responses to this problem—disclosure and
peer review—have been tried, but failed. 134 Thus, even while eliding over the
nuances of a full-blown First Amendment analysis, it is clear that a moneyblinding mandate may survive constitutional scrutiny.
misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more
circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in
proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed
carefully to achieve the State’s goal. Compliance with this requirement may be
measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state
interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose. Second, if the
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on
commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (citations
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The constitutional analysis can also be approached from an altogether
different track, one that may avoid First Amendment scrutiny altogether. A
money-blinding mandate could draw upon the bribery, kickback, gratuity,
graft, and conflict of interest statutes that already exist to insulate the
integrity of government officers from payments that would otherwise be
protected as speech. 135 It would clearly be illegal for a company to pay a
government official a quid pro quo to declare that its drug is safe and
effective.136 It would even be illegal to pay a government official to undertake a
study that he otherwise would not have undertaken, or to do such a study on
more favorable terms. Many courts have held that the laws proscribing this
sort of behavior avoid First Amendment scrutiny altogether. 137
Notwithstanding the language of these holdings, it may be more accurate to
say that these restrictions on speech would withstand constitutional scrutiny,
on the facts presented in these cases. 138
135
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136
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137
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at *8 (W.D. Va. May 7, 2009) (same); Roberts v. State, 278 S.W.3d 778, 790 (Tex. App. 2008)
(same); Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172,
1184 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[C]ampaign contributions made ‘with a corrupt intent to influence . . .
the person to whom it is given, in his action, vote, or opinion, in any public or offic ial capacity’
are not protected because they are not a ‘valid’ exercise of one’s constitutional ri ghts of free
speech or petition”) (quoting Paul for Council v. Ricki Hanyecz, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1366-67
(2001)); United States v. Tutein, 82 F. Supp. 2d 442, 447 (D. Virgin Is. 2000) (“[A] private
party has no First Amendment right to petition the Government by means of . . . payment of
bribes”) (quoting In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1087 (N.D. Cal.
1979)); Dawkins v. State, 208 So.2d 119, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (“One cannot threaten,
intimidate, bribe, or otherwise imminently seek to affect the outcome of grand or petit jury
deliberations and then seek refuge in the First Amendment. . .”); see also United States v.
Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232, 1235 (9th Cir. 1988) (“extortionate speech . . . is undoubtedly within
the government’s power to prohibit”); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (“It may categorically be stated that extortionate
speech has no more constitutional protection than that uttered by a robber while ordering his
victim to hand over the money, which is no protection at all”); People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d
628, 636-38 (Colo. 1999) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on a statute making it a crime
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v. Lance, 721 P.2d 1258, 1264-65, 1267 (Mont. 1986) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on a
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For an explanation of the doctrine, see Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the
Uses of Language 249 (1989) (arguing that “[m]y basic position is that such utterances are
genuinely situation-altering. They do not inform the listener about the environment he or she
inhabits; they change that environment by generating options which did not previously ex ist
and which would never have existed had it not been for the offer or threat. Because they do
something rather than say something, they fall outside a principle of free speech.”). More
accurately, an offer of a bribe both does something (create an incentive) and says something
(notify of the incentive).
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Extending this analysis, Kathleen Clark has suggested that government
contractors should be held to similar standards as governmental employees,
with regard to conflicts of interests. 139 As a matter of statute, Congress has
already extended the wire and mail fraud crimes to protect the objectivity of
state officials and even of private persons (such as union bosses or company
CEOs) from improper influence. 140 In principle, the government could
similarly proscribe industry efforts to improperly influence the discretion
exercised by scientists. If Congress or the FDA extended such protection to
biomedical researchers, it would not seem to cross any constitutional line, and
thus the regulation deserves as little, or as much, First Amendment scrutiny as
the current bribery, gratuity, and conflict of interest statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that biomedical science drives a significant
portion of the practice of medicine and the billions of dollars of spent on
healthcare in America each year. Thus the integrity of biomedical science
would seem to be foundational to a well-functioning healthcare system. It is
critical that biomedical science be objective, and that it appear objective, so
that physicians and regulators can confidently rely upon it.
Once the root causes of biased science are well understood, we will be left
with two options to solve the problem: an outright ban on industry support of
biomedical science, or something like money-blinding—which would preserve
industry’s subsidy of science while attempting to cleanse the money of any
biasing influence. A ban on industry funding would be devastating to
scientific progress, and would likely face insurmountable constitutional and
political obstacles. Money-blinding is thus a promising partial solution, even
if it would not completely extirpate industry’s role in setting the agenda for
biomedical science.
The legal analysis suggests that if private ordering fails there are multiple
mechanisms for regulators to facilitate a move towards money-blinding,
without running afoul of the Constitution. Whether a money-blinding
mandate avoids First Amendment scrutiny altogether, is reviewed as
commercial speech, or is reviewed under strict scrutiny, it has some
reasonable likelihood of surviving.
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